"tribal discipline has disappeared" due to the fact that young men were more educated than their elders. 22 Mau Mau, Askwith believed, was a symptom of the "disintegration" of a "whole generation", psychologically damaged by the absence of elder authority.
23
Boyce's diagnosis of juvenile delinquency fit neatly with Askwith's conception of the Mau Mau movement as one of psychological distress, rather than political grievance. Though their conception of Mau Mau hinged upon a racist view of "backwards" Kikuyu struggling with modernity, both Askwith and Boyce believed that remedies that the Save the Children Fund had pioneered for juvenile delinquents in a European context could be reconfigured for youth caught up in the Kenyan emergency. 24 There were few institutions to deal with the youngest suspected Mau Mau. The Child Protection (Emergency Regulation) Act of 1954 decreed that unaccompanied minors in Nairobi should be sent to reserves or missionary orphanages. 25 However, the chaos of mass incarcerations and the overburdening of Nairobi municipal courts meant that many children and teenagers spent months in transit camps designed for 'screening' adults. 26 Children as young as seven were beaten by prison guards, often going days without food, shelter, clothes and blankets. 27 Living in such conditions and close to suspected adult Mau Mau, it seemed to Boyce inevitable that these boys would be "contaminated by Mau Mau" ideas.
28
Within the colonial administration there was confusion about the age at which youths ceased to be protected by the 1952 legislation and became legally adult. 29 problem of juvenile delinquency was passed around a number of departments, all reluctant to accept responsibility. 30 The Save the Children Fund had recently had its own debates about the distinction between childhood and youth, raising its own age limit for intervention from 14 to 18, as part of its wider shift from focusing on the bodies of children to treating their minds. In the interwar period, the fund drew upon Victorian religious and romantic discourses to categorise children as innocent and apolitical, focused on material succour. After 1945, having witnessing the weaponization of adolescence by totalitarian states, the Fund became interested in the political potency of 'youth' (broadly, ages 12-18). It sought to provide moral and material interventions that would steer an emotionally-damaged generation towards an adulthood of democratic citizenship, in an era of anxiety about the rising tide of communism. reconstruct Europe and 'modernize' societies in north-east Asia and Latin America via the promotion and preservation of nuclear family units. Working in the early stages of the Cold War, these organizations sought not only to prevent the creation of a new generation of juvenile delinquents, but to ward off totalitarianism.
37
Save the Children seized upon the zeitgeist and proclaimed its own special interest and expertise in juvenile delinquency. Hosting a series of international conferences, Save the Children discussed best practice for the rehabilitation of delinquent youth and argued that institutions replicating the structure of nuclear families were the most likely to re-establish emotional stability. 38 To replicate the bond between youth and parents, Save the Childrensponsored reformatories organized juveniles into mixed age 'houses', each with their own leader, a trusted adult figure to act as a role model for discipline and support. 39 This system of prefects, a house system, and multi-layered structures of authority, though based on new psychoanalytic observations, closely replicated a far older British tradition: boarding school.
Yet boarding school was based on the premise that growing up in proximity to parents undermined the psychological robustness of young men, while reformatories were a response to the problem created by the lack of parents' emotional guidance and authority. 
II.
In the early days of the Kenyan Emergency, the colonial government assumed that African men were the drivers of conflict, and that African women were its victims. 64 For the most part, the colonial government attempted to take a "softer" approach to rebellious women, believing that women were more malleable than men, and therefore more likely to respond to rehabilitation efforts outside the prison pipeline. Although over 8,000
women were incarcerated in the prison camps at Gitamayu 118 Nonetheless, the work of the British Red Cross in colonial emergencies represented a significant departure from earlier activities. They were involved not just in state-sanctioned care for civilian populations, but the containment and punishment of large-scale revolt against British rule. In separating mothers from children, and seeking to make family reunification contingent on how far women enacted European forms of domesticity, the Red Cross endorsed a form of cultural and emotional coercion that has not yet been written into historical accounts of violence at the end of empire.
III.
The British Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund claimed to be internationalist, impartial Union of Child Welfare (IUCW). Neither body had a large operational budget and both focused on discussing and co-ordinating the interventions of their nationally-based affiliates during crises. The ICRC, the IUCW and their worldwide affiliates were avowedly 'non-political', and claimed to work for the 'good of humanity'. 'Impartiality' had never precluded support for British imperialism, and internationalism and imperialism were not viewed as contradictory creeds. Indeed, leaders of the ICUW celebrated the British Empire as a model of international co-operation and brotherhood to which the rest of the world could aspire.
119 When the Britishbased branches of these international humanitarian organizations stepped in to address the shortcomings of the colonial state, they were attempting to improve the Empire, choosing to perceive it as an empire founded on brotherhood, benevolent rule and the duty of white metropolitan elites to 'civilise' colonial subjects overseas.
When damning critiques of colonial brutality were laid before them by Western anti- "did NOT do its duty" in Kenya.
129
The British Red Cross had, in fact, chastised the colonial government about the sanitary conditions of prisoners, stating that some camps were "unfit even to house animals". In 1954,
the British Red Cross demanded that the British government should do "something on the health side of things" to improve conditions, and believed that this advice had been acted upon. 130 British Red Cross representatives who visited the camps did not, however, object to the interrogation and punishment methods used, which oral testimonies and recovered documents would later reveal involved torture, forced exercise, forced labour and routine deprivation of food, water and medical attention. While it is possible that British Red Cross delegates were not fully aware of these practices, a number of its representatives in Kenya felt that "British justice in its traditional form is hopelessly unsuitable in the present situation". As public critique intensified in Britain, questions raised in the press or in parliament about conduct in Kenya often centred on the plight of women and children, and could be addressed by citing the 'excellent work' of the Save the Children Fund, the British Red Cross, and various missionary societies. 139 Save the Children and the British Red Cross issued regular ringing endorsements of the colonial government that had (they claimed) ensured that the "emergency has not been allowed to interfere with the long-term welfare of these people", and had instead used it as an opportunity to make "far seeing plans" for education and social were given this milk for their children did not draw distinctions between the colonial state, the British-led aid organization that distributed the milk, and the UN-affiliated aid organization that funded it. To them, the milk was not a symbol of international compassion, but of colonial control. Pouring the milk on the ground was a gesture of defiance against the state that had moved them to barren land and imprisoned their communities. To colonised communities the lines between the colonial state and non-state aid organizations, and between imperial violence and international aid, were far from self-evident.
Yet, despite these blurred boundaries, the existing literature on humanitarianism has often taken claims of impartiality as a starting point, with both historians and contemporary commentators broadly assuming that aid organizations overcame ethical misgivings in order to collaborate with states, and that collaboration with states was a reluctant compromise made when they could not otherwise access suffering populations. Rather, as we have seen, across the British Empire during its violent decolonization struggles, collusion with the state was an opportunity to expand humanitarian work and uphold a vision of British imperialism they believed compatible to be with international humanitarian ideals. Humanitarian organizations sought to diminish the impact of colonial violence on both civilian populations and the public image of Empire. Humanitarian intervention lent credence to the notion that 'rehabilitation' was a modernising project, drawing on international expertise to aid colonial peoples caught between tradition and modernity. In Kenya, it delegitimised Mau Mau as a political movement, portraying anticolonial resistance as psychosis rather than political grievance. The basis for collusion between humanitarian organizations and the state was this shared vision of the emergency as a crisis of transition between tradition and modernity, and a shared understanding of 'rehabilitation'. This notion rested on invented tradition: an idealized, colonial African past to which Kenyans could be restored, while also benefitting from a modern capitalist economy.
During the wars of decolonization, humanitarian NGOs were not only rewriting the colonial past, but preserving the empire's future. In the 1960s, territorial colonialism was replaced with 'expert' western aid organizations, as they flocked to recently decolonized states to oversee agricultural, welfare and development projects. 144 Although such projects symbolized new eras of partnership and development, the staff had often gained their experience and ideals through colonial service. 
